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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DOYLE LAWRENCE, an infant, by
JESSE LAWRENCE, his Guardian
ad Litem,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Civil No. 8244

vs.
BAMBERGER RAILROAD
PANY, a corporation,

COM-

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

The statement of facts in appellant's brief is believed
to be incomplete and, except for its description of the
accident scene, is vague and n1is.leading. It -contains no
references to pages of the record. Therefore, we have
dee·med it necessary to make our own statement of the
record in order that the Court will have a proper understanding of the problern presented for determination.
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Henceforth, the parties will he designated as plaintiff a·nd defendant and references to the record will
relate to the red numerals stampe~d on each page. of the
record rather than to the typed numerals on the transcrip~t of testimony, \Vhich latter numerals have been used
in the ''Argument'' section of plaintiff's brief.
This is an action to recover damages for personal
injuries.. At the conclusion of piaintiff·; s . evidence the
Distriet Court granted a .motion for dismissal and thereafter entered judgment for ·defendant. The plaintiff
file-d a motion for new trial and, after· hearing oral
argument, the court ~denied this motion. The plaintiff
has appealed to this Court .from the judgment and from
the order denying his motion for a new trial (R. 110).
Plaintiff's ·complaint, as amended at the first of two
pretrial hearings, alleged that on March 9, 1951 plaintiff ·suffered peTsonal injuries when he was struck by
a triain owned and operated by defendant. It was alleged
that the train was ''willfully, wantonly all!d negligently
driven over the body'' of the plaintiff. (R. 1) ~ In its
answer defendant admitte(j that its train struck the
plaintiff, hut it denied that if was guilty of negligence
and alleged that plaintiff's con·duct contributed to his
injury, or that his injuries were solely caused by his
own eonduct.
Two pretrial hearings, and the trial its.elf, were
conducted by Judge A. H. Ellett, sitting without a jury.
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The accident occurred on the railroad right-of-way
of the defendant eo1npany near the intersection of Eighth
North and Third 'Vest Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah.
At this point defendant maintains double railroad tracks
running in a north-south direction. The tracks are
crossed at a right angle by Eighth North Street, and
immediately north of the edge of the street the:re is an
as·phalt area on each side of the tracks vrhich areas are
used by passengers in waiting for, and boarding, inteTurban electric passenger tr·ains (See photo, E;xhibit 1).
The record does. not reveal plaintiff's age. He was
a student at West High School (R. 48). He was described
by a medical witness, Dr. N.elson, as being of medium
s~ze and ''somewhat smaller perhaps'' than five feet
eleven and one-half inches, but not smaller than defendant's counsel, Mr. Snow (R.. 38), (who is five feet nine
and one-'half inches tall). For several years plaintiff
had been afflicted with museular dystrophy. As a result
of this condition he walked vvith a rolling gait. However,
Dr. Nelson testified that the degree of development of
muscular dystrophy in the plaintiff vvas not such that it
was likely to be observed by a layman, although the
doctor felt that he would have no ~difficulty as a physician
deter1nining that something was wrong with the plaintiff
(R. 37, 38).
Dr. Nelson was the only medical witness called by
plaintiff. He first examined plaintiff in August, 1951,
approxin1ately five months after the accident (R. 40).
At that time plaintiff was also suffering from a mental
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condition kno"\\rn as sehiz'Ophrenia. This condition manifests itself by delusions and hallucinations. It was Dr.
Nelson's opinion that plaintiff had been suffering from
this condition for ap·proximately one year, but he could
not express any opinion as to the ·degree of severity
of the condition at the time of the accident (R. 40). The
doctor expressed the opinion that plaintiff might have
had only a mild condition p-rior to· the accident, and that
the c?~ndition had been aggravated by tihe accident (R.
31, 41).
1

While it was clear theref·ore that Dr. Nelson could
not describe with accuracy plaintiff's condition on the
day of the accident, it is a fair inferen;ce from the
record to say that plaintiff was then 'suffering from some
de·gree ·of schizophrenia.
Plaintiff appeared at the scene of the accident just
prior to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, defendant's train, consisting of a locomotive, s.even loaded
freight cars, and one empty ear (Ex. 2), was proceeding
south and approaching the area ·of Eighth North and
Third· West Streets.. The locomotive was an ·electric
type, op·erated by a motorman. The remainder of the
crew consisted of a trolleym·an, a conductor and a brakeman .. (R. 65).
As is seen fron1 Exhibit 1, the tracks curved to the
northwest several hundred feet north of the crossing.
As ·the train rounded this curve and came into the
straight tracks, the trolleyman, Skeen, testified that he
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saw plaintiff "'alk frorn the a3phalt vvaiting area on the
east side of the tracks. Plaintiff went aeross both sets
of tracks to the. vYest waiting area. When he was firs.t
seen by Skeen, the train was approximately 150 yards
away. (R. 71). It was at about this point that the
motorn1an shut off the train po\ver and first applied
air to the air ·brakes ( R. 66).
When the train \Yas about 100 yards from the point
of impact, Skeen observeq plaintiff, (who had been
standing in the west waiting area, facing west,) turn
around, 'valk east again, and take a position in the middle
of the southbound tracks, ·facing the oncoming tr,ain CR.
71, 72). There was nothing unusual or peculiar about
the way plaintiff walked at this time, according to Skeen
(R. 76). It \Vas apparently not unusual for a person
to \Valk on the track and stand there in the face of an
oncoming train, since plaintiff's counsel elicited frorn
Skeen the fact that such "incidents are bountiful" (R.
75).
As the train continued forward, plaintiff made no
move to leave his position in the center of the track.
(R. 82). During .the last 100 yards before impact, the
train bell was ringing, the air horn was sounded in short
-blasts, and the motorman leaned out the window of the
locomotive cab and shouted and \Yaved his arms (R. 72,
73). Although there is no evidence in the record on
the speed of the train, it appears to be a fair inference
that it was rnoving slowly, since it did not traverse much
distanee while plain tiff 'vas moving back and forth across
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the traclrs, and it came to a full stop, after the emergency
application of brakes, in approxin1ately. 200 feet, even
though the totHl -vveight of the train exceeded 788,300
pounds. (R. 84, Exhibit 2).
Even though the train hell and horn were being
sounded and the motorman was shouting and waving his
arms, plain tiff "ras motionless, except that he shifted
from one foot to the other (R. 83). According to Skeen,
who was the only ey·e-witness who testified, plaintiff
''just stood watching us
that kid was just seared
stiff ... " (R. 83).
When the train reached a point about 50 yards from
plaintiff, Skeen decided plaintiff was not going to move
off the tr-ack and, at that point, the motorman threw
all available air into the braking system in an emergency
stop procedure (R. 78). Despite these measures, the
train continued on, striking the plaintiff and ·coming to
a stop fifty or sixty feet beyond (R. 84). Plaintiff's leg
was so severely mangled it was necessary to amputate
below the knee.· (R. 24).
According to what plaintiff 'Sl;lhsequently told his
fiather and Dr. Nelson (R. 26, 89), he had been told by
a voice to get on the track to test his faith in God. He
sai~d he \Vas told no harm would come to him, but at the
same time, he recognized there was danger present. In
the ·opinion of Dr. Nelson, there would have been no
true test of his faith in God if there had been no danger
(R. 29).
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The evidence concerning plaintiff's mental condition on the day of the accident vvas nece,ssarily bas-ed
upon his interviews vvith Dr. Nelson 5 months later,
since no eYidence \Yas produced concerning any· medical
consultations or treatn1ent at or about the time of the
accident. Dr. Nelson conceded (R. 35) that what plaintiff
told him in August, 1951 about the accident was not
necessarily accurate, since a patient in such condition
may have a faulty memory, or may, at the time of interview, be even then suffering from another delusion, upon
which his story would ·be based. (R. 36, 37).
In ruling upon defendant's motion for dismissal at
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the trial court stated
that he found no ·negligence upon the part of defendant's
motorman, since there was nothing in the ap·pearance of
plaintiff, vvhile he stood upon the track, to give notice to
the motorman that plaintiff was incapacitated or otherwise unable to move 'from the track. ( R. 95-96).
Following plaintiff's appeal from the judgment
and ruling of the trial court, defendant filed its own
Statement of Points by way of cross~appeal, contending
that the tria'l court erred in ruling plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent because of his mental condition.
(R. 109).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRAN'TED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
I.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MO·TION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE PRO'XIMATE
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. ·
.III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MO·TION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE E S T A B L I SHED CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER o·F LAW~
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EX·QLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF
THE WITNESS SKEEN RELATIVE TO OVERLOADING OF
THE TRAIN.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT C 0 R R E C T L Y GRANTED
DEF·ENDANT'S MOTIO:N FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
I.

It is fund:amental in the law of torts that reasonable
foresight of h·arm is essential to the ·concept of negligence
an~d supplies the criterion for determining whether negligence existed in a particular cas.e. A person is not
bound to foresee every possible injury which might occur,.
or every p·ossible eventuality, but only those that are
reasonably foreseeable. A person is. not bound to foresee
and provide ·against casualties which are, in the light of
human experience, ·beyond the range of probability, or
which would not occur except under circumstances which
are exceptional, and failure to anticipate or guard ·against
a remote possibilit~r of accident does not constitute
a-ctiona:bl e negligence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

The existence of negligenee in a given situation Inust
be deter1nined on the facts as they appeare~d at the time.
Foresight, not retrospect, is the standard of diligence.
Negligence cannot be satisfactorily established merely by
showing t'hat had the actor acted otherwise no accident
\\'"ould have happened, or by the fact that after an accident
has happened it ean then be shown howitcouldhave been
prevented, or avoided, or by the fact that the person
charged failed to exercise that degree of care which
would have prevented the injury.
The proper inquiry is not whether the accident might
he avoided if the one charged with negligence had anticipated its. occurrence, but whether, taking the circum.stances as they then existed, he was negligent in failing
to anticipate and provide against the occurrence.
These are familiar and tested principles. They
require no citation of. authority, but supporting cases
'vill be found at 65 C.,J .S. 354-362 (Negligence, Section
5).
These basic concepts were 'veil understood by the
trial court in ruling upon defendant'·s 1notion for dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, at which
time the court said :

''I find as a matter of law that the engineer
in charge of the train was not negligent in that
prior to the time when he was within approximately 50 yards he 'had no re·ason to believe that
the plaintiff would not remove himself from
· between the rails of the track upon which the
engine was running, and that at that time it was
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too late for him to stop the train. Inasmuch as
he ha·d seen the plaintiff ~ambulatory and walk in
front of _the train, there was nothing to place
him on guard or on notice that the plaintiff was
insane or otherwi'Se incapacitated." (R. 95-96)
Plaintiff, however, argues .that a r-ailroad enginee-r
has a duty to stop his train immediately upon observing
a person upon the track. He cites Choqu.ette v. Key
System Transit Co., et al., (D~strict Court of Appeal of
Calif., 1g.31) 5 P. ( 2d) 921, ·to sup·port this novel and
startling. assertion. In that case plaintiff brought action
for personal injuries sustained when she was struck by
a train while erossing the tracks in the ·city ·of Berkeley.
Plaintiff had alighted from a street car and was stru·ck
by a train of the Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe R·ailway
Co.· The engineer saw plaintiff start to cross the track.
When he s~aw her step into a place of danger he blew the
whistle and turned off the throttle. The locomotive was
then about forty feet away. T·he testimony was in conflict as to when t he brakes were applied, whether hefore
or after plaintiff was struck. The Court said:
1

"T:here is nothing in this evidence, in our
opinion, which would even justify an inference
that the engineer when he first saw plaintiff
failed to exercise that degree of care which the
law required of him. As soon as he perceived
or realized that plaintiff might be inattentive
to peril he soun·ded his whistle, and at this time
there was nothing to e:reate a dou;ht as to whether
he sincerely believed the calamity would be pre-
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vented by the activity of plaintiff. Under sueh
circumstances, he did all tha.t was required of
him.''
'!'he judgment of non-suit in favor of defendants
was affir1ned. It is obvious that this decision is ~ot
authority for the rule contended for by plaintiff.·
Plaintiff also cites Green v. Los Angeles Terminal
Rwy. Co., (Calif. 1903), 76 P. 719, as authority for
i1nposing an absolute duty to stop a train when a pe~rson
is on the track.
That was an action for \\~rongful death of a person
struck by a locomotive. The evidence showed that
deceased wa:s guilty of contributory negligence, hut that
the engineer could have .avoided the collision by slackening the speed of the train or warning deceased of her
danger, and upon this theory of last ·clear chance the
verdict in favor of plaintiff was affirmed. (Emphasis
added).
On re-hearing, the case wa:s revers·ed and remanded
for a new trial ·because the court determined that the
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable.

Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (Minn., 1901) 87
N.W. 843, also cited by plaintiff as support for the rule
asserted, held a pers.on failing to look in the direction
of an approaching train to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiff in that case
contended that defendant's servants could have discovered plaintiff's danger and their failure to ring bell
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or make an effort to avoid the accident authoriz·ed submission of the case to th-e jury. The court said:
''The engineer could not be held to suppose
absolutely, as a matter of law, that a young man
of good inteiligence, with average faculties, before
going. on a railway crossing would keep his head
turned away from the direction which a train
might he approaching. . . . " ( p. 844).
The last case cited by plaintiff upon this proposition
is L.ee v. Market St. Ry. Co., (Calif., 1901) 67 P. 765.
This case simply ho~ds that under the peeuliar facts
present, and in view of the. conflict in testimony, the
.matter was properly submitted to the jury. The holding
cannot be considered to support plaintiff's position in the
present cas.e.
It will he noted that each of these cases was based
upon the ·doctrine of last clear chance. This doctrine was
not framed as an issue at either pre-trial in the present
cas.e an~d was not urged prior to . this appeal. Also, in
each of the cited cases it was an inattentive plaintiff who
was injured. Such cases can h·ave no application under
the fa:cts of the instant case where the plaintiff was
. ob~io~'i:v aware of the .approaching train and did not
indicate iri any way that he would not remov.e hims·elf
from the track until it was too late to avoid the accident.
Plaintiff, apparently conscious of the fact .that the
decisions cited do not supp·qrt the rule· urged, argues
that ~an engineer must not pass that point where he cannot control his train in time to avoi~d injury. In sup-
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port of this argu1nent, plaintiff, at the top of page 15
of his brief, quotes a rule from American Jurisprudence.
In ordeT. for the quoted rule to give aid to plaintiff,
counsel apparently believed it necessary to omit -a key
phraHe from the first portion of the rule and to omit
co1npletely the concluding sentence. The complete rule
is set forth below, \vith the portion Oinitted ·by counsel
italicized :
''Due care generally does not require the
engineer to stop the train, but he may act on the
supposition that the traveler wHl stop before
reaching the track. If, however, the traveler ·continues his course, the engine·er must not rest upon
'this supposition so long :as to allow his engine to
reaeh the point wheTe it will become impossible
for him to control his train, or give warning in
· time to prevent injury to th~ traveler. When it
is apparent, or. when in the exercise of reasonable
diligence commenswr.ate w·ith the surroundings it
sho1ild be apparent, to the cornpany that a person
on its track or abou.t to get on its track is unaware
of his danger or c-annot get out of the way, it
becomes the duty of the comp.any to use such
precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or
otherwise,. as may be 'reasonabty necessary to
avoid injury to him.'' 44 American Jurisprudence 749 (Railroads) Section 509.
It is thus clear that counsel cannot use this rule to
support plaintiff's argument. The record is conclusive
that warning was given and plaintiff was, and appeared
to he, a'vare of the approach of the tr.ain.
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The case of Eleddles v. Chica,go N.W. Ry. Co. (Wis.,
1890) 46 N.W. 115, also quoted from, involved an inattentive seven year old. plaintiff oblivious of the approach
of the train. It vvas ~admitted that no 'vhistle was sounded.
Such cases have no application under the facts of
this case.
The rule of la:vv vvhich is controlling under the facts
of this ease is well -state·d in American Jurisprudence:
"Th~ mere fact that the engineer sees ape~
son on or dangerously near- a railway track in
front of his moving train -does not require him to
-endeavor to stop the train,.- for he has a right to
assume, in the absence of anything to indicate
otherwise,_ that such person will get out of his
dangerous position in time to avoid a collision
and inj-ury, and the doctrine of last clear chance
is not ealled into operation. It is only when it
-beeomes or s:hould become- apparent that such
person· 'ijs apparently placing himself in a position of danger without b-eing aware of the
approaching' train or car that it is plainly the
duty of trainmen_ to take -cognizance of that fact
and avoid injury to him if practicable.
· * * * From the .character an·d momentum of a
railroad train, and the requirements of public
travel by means thereof, it cannot be expected that
it shall stop- and give precedence to -an approaching traveler to make . the crossing first; the
traveler must yield the use of the railroad track
to an approaching train, an·d the conduct of the
train. crew may he la\vfully predicated upon the
expectation that travelers will observe their duty
in this regard.'' 44 A·nterican Jurisprudence 727,
734-5 (Railroad's)
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This rule vvas, incidentally, quoted with ~approval in
Ross v. Fleming (I{an., 1948), 194 P. (2d) 491, another
decision cited by plaintiff. None of the other de-cisions
cited by plaintiff are inconsistent with this rule.
A 1nicroscopic exarnination of the entire record in
this ease fails to sho'v any evidence that a reasona1ble
man in the position of the engineer of defendant railroad would, prior to the occurrence, have foreseen the
likelihood of injury to the plaintiff. That there was
nothing ''startling or unusual'' (R. 38) about the appe,arance of plaintiff on the day of the accident is we~ll
dernonstrated by the testin1ony of witness Blaine Skeen,
Trolleyman, called ~by plainti.ff:

"Q.

In your observation of this boy, did you
notice anything peculiar ·or unusu·al about
him that was different from other people
you have seen standing at a track~
mean~

A.

How do you

Q.

Well, did you notice anyt'hing that led you
to think he looked different~ Did he walk
any differently from a normnl pe-rson~''

A.

No, not that I could tell.

Q.

Did he do anything that led you to believe
he wasn't going to get off the tracks~

A.

Yes, about - seemed like about 50 yards
fron1 the point of impact." (R. 76)

On cross-exarnination this vvitness stated that vvhen
the engine Nas about 50 yards fron1 the point of impact
1
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it ap·peare·d that the plaintiff "\\7-as not going to get off
the track and that at that time etnergency brake application was made. Some brake ap·plication had been made
prior to that time (R. 78). ·
Piaintiff was of mediun1 size, ordinary appear·ance,
and had been observed walking in .a normal manner.
Evidence ~as to his n1anner of walking on other occasions
is not p·ertinent in view of the testimony of plaintiff's
witness.
Nowhere is the fallacy of plaintiff's position more
clearly illustrated than on p·age 7 of his brief, where he
asserts that ''the general rule of law covering the instant
case'' permits the train engine·er to presume that ·a person on or near the tracks is "in possession of his natural
faculties'' and will take due care of his own safety until
tthe engineer ''knows or should know that the person
apparently will not get ... out of· danger, or until the
situation otherwise ·dis·closes: itself to a reasonable man
on guard.''
It is inherent, in such a rule, that plaintiff must
show some evidence which would in·dicate to a ''reasonable man on guard'' that plaintiff would not get out
of ·danger. This rule defe·ats plaintiff's cas.e since he
has failed to show any such evidence. Precisely the contrary is shown by the testimony of plaintiff's principal
'vitness that there 'vas nothing unusual about plaintiff's
manner until the tr•ain was 50 yards from him, ~and then
the engineer did everything possi~ble to avoid the aooident.
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Plaintiff, how·ever, argues that his demeanor made
it apparent he vvould not get off the track (Brief, p. 9).
He fails to 1nention the uncontradicted evidence produced
hy his ovvn eye vvitness that when the unusual conduct

occurred, the engineer n1ade an emergency application
of brakes. He further argues that the eircumstances
required responsive action when his own testimony
establishes that responsive action \Vas taken immed'i,ately
vYhen those circumstances appeared. The argument is
palpably \veak and is crushed by the weight of plaintiff's o'vn evidence.
Plaintiff becomes further entangled with principles
when he. asserts that, because the accident could have
been ~avoided by use of emergency brakes at 70 yar~ds,
it was negligence for the engineer not to have ~applied
emergency brakes a.t that distance. Plaintiff':s hindsight
is remarkably clear. Equally clear is the proposition that
negligence cannot be established .merely by showing
that had the actor acted otherwise, no aecident would
have occurred. Under plaintiff's theory, it would have
been negligence to have started the train at all . See
Eckenrode v. Penn. R. R. Co. (D.C.E.D. Penn., 1947), 71
Fed. Supp. 764.
Pl~aintiff

cites numerous decisions Wlhich de~al generally V\rith the proble1n posed by this ea.se. All of these
cases, hovvever, rest upon the fundan1ental rule that
negligence depends upon foreseeability of injury.
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Plaintiff has studiously avoided citations of Utah
decisions analagous to the tl1e ease under consideration.
One such case is .St.eggel v. S. L. ~ U. R ..Qo. (Ut!ah, 1917),
50 Utah 139, 167 Pac. 237. In that case Steggel 'vas
'valking· between the rails of defendant's track near
American Fork, Utah, when. he was. stru'Ck ·by a tr·ain
and kille·d. The track was unobstructed and ran in a
straight line east and west. The train was running west
from American .Fork at about 25 or 30 mph. The deceased
appro.ache·d on the track from the west and \Vas observed.
for a distance of about one-half mile until the accident.
No attempt was made to check the spee~d of the train until
it was too late to avoid stri.king the de'ceased. D·eceas·ed
ha·d his hat pulled down to shade his eyes. The .day was
bright .and the vie'Y unobstucted. Witnesses. for the
plaintiff testified that they had assumed the _deceased
would step off the track in time to avoid injury. Defendant ·expected deeeased to step from the track momentarily
as the train. was approaehing. This Court said:
"To say that, under the circumstances and
surrounding this· accident, as disclosed
by the undisputed testim·ony, th~ defendant' was
negligent, or, seeing the plaintiff's position and
conduct while walking toward the approaching
train, it recklessly or wantonly failed in its duty
to the deceased, is to say that, in every case "\vhere
a footman is seen approaching a moving train, it
becomes the duty of the train crew ·Or operators
in eharge to at once assume that no duty rests
upon the footman to take any respon'Sihility on
himself or to exercise any care or precaution for
his own peTsonal safety and protection ; tha't the
~conditions
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operators of the train n1ust bring it to a standstill until the footn1an ·becomes mindful of the fact
that he has placed himself in a dangerous position
and concludes to step aside and ~permit the train
to pass and subserve, in some measure, the convenience and safety of the public. Where, ·as here
the undisputed facts are the deceased, being of
mature age, sound of body and mind, without
neeessity chooses to enter and 'va1k upon the
defendant's track when the day was bright, the
view unobstructed for more than a mile before
him, and deliberately walks along th~ track in
view of a rapidly approaching train which was,
upon his entering the track, more than a mile away,
by every reasonable hypothesis the defendant had
the right to assume that he would see and hear,
a;s it was his duty to see and hear, the approaching
train, and that he would be timely in removing
himself to a place of safety and avoid injury.''
(Page 240.)
The true test in cases of this kind has been well
pointed out by Utah decisions distinguishing hetwe·en the
duty o-vved by railroad engineers to small children and
the duty owed apparent adults. In Palmer v. Oregon
Shortline R. R. Co., 34 Utah 466, 98 P. 689 (1908), the
Court said:
"In case of an adult or one of age having
judgn1ent and discretion, who is a trespasser and
is seen standing or walking on the track, the train
operator in the first instance would have to do no
more than give such a trespa'sser a warnjng.
When this has been done the operator Tnay .assume
that the trespasser will leave the track. Not so
with child of tender years.''

a
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. In J~rnalley v. 1-lio Grande Western R. R. Co., 34 Ut·ah
423, 98 .Pac.. 311 (1908), a ease involving a child of five
years of age, the Court .sai:d that ·an adult trespasser may
be· expected t~ take care of himself and keep out of
danger and the en1ployees about· the premises may regulate their conduct upon the presumption that he would
·do so, until a situation is disclosed making ··it apparent
that ·he is not a\\·are of the danger or peril threatening
him. (Emp'hasis ours).
In this case, plaintiff's own evidence shows that
plaintiff w·as ap·parently a'vare of the ·danger at all times
and was, to all,ap·pearances, able to take care of himself
until the train was 50 yards from the point of impact and
that at that instant full emergency procedures were taken
to ~avoid the accident. The duty which plaintiff urges
should he imposed upon the operators of railroads is
the du~y to diagnose, ·from an engine cab at a distance
of 100 yards, a condition of schizophrenia, catatonic
type, and progressive muscular dystrophy and to be able
. to determine and understand that a person who was
ambulatory only seconds earlier, cannot now, because of
such conditions, n1ove hack to the point of safety from
'\\'"hich he had come.
Plaintiff also urges th:at a city ordinance was violated
in that the vvarning hell was not -s·ounded 440 yards bef.ore
the crossing. This argument appears in this case for the
first ti!ue in plaintiff's brief (Page 6). No such contention wa~ n1ade at the pretrials, as plaintiff must surely
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have understood that the purpose of such an ordinance
is to codify the rule that an eng~ineer has a duty to give
notice of the approach of the train and that the requirelnents are 1net when the train is at all times plainly visible,
is actually observed, and its approach known.
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT· PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.

The sole proximate cause of plwintiff's injuries was
plaintiff's eonduct in placing himself upon the tracks in
front of the approaching train. This conduct was the
efficient producing cause. The failure of the engineer to
stop the tr~ain \vas at most, under the cireumstances
disclosed by this record, a condition permitting plaintiff's own ·conduct to produce his injury.
In J(ent et al v. Ogden L. ~I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah 328,
167 P. 666 (1917) Mary Kent was struck ~and killed by
a train \vhile \vaiting near the tracks at ~a crossing. The
witnesses testified that Mary Kent crossed the tracks
in front of the train; that she was standing ne,ar the end
of the railroad tie when hit by the train. In reversing
judgment for the plaintiff the ·court said:
''If the deceased had stood upon the track
under the circumstances here di~selosed until she
was struck, no one could, in reason, contend that
the position which she carelessly assumed was
not the proxirnate cause of her injury. If tha~t be
so, how can it reasonably be contended that the
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position which she carelessly assumed, so near
the track as to he in the path of the passing cars,
likewise was not the cause of her injury~ Where
one voluntarily assumes a position on or so near
a r·ailway track that ·a train of cars in passing on
the track must necessarily strike him, can reasonable min ds differ as to whether his act in so
placing himself ~as the proximate cause of injury
in ease the cars strike him~. We think not. What
is: there to differ about~ It is physically impossible for one to e'Scap·e injury ·if he· remains on
or so near a railway traek as to he in the path
of a ~passing train of cars. Even children are
aware of the danger under those eircumstances.
1

This cas.e is not distinguishable from the case of
Steggel v. S. L. & Ut,ah R. Co., 50 Utah 139, 167

P. 237."
The p·roximate cause· of an injury is the primary
moving cause without" which it would not have :been
inflicted, but which, in the natural and ·probable sequence
of events, and without the intervention of any new or
independent eause, produoes the injury. Cox v. Thompson (Utah, 1953) 254 P. (2~d) 1047.
The o1nission vvhich plaintiff eompl~ains of in this
case is the f~ailure of the engineer to place the b:vakes in
em·ergency position 70 yards or n1ore north of the point
of impact. Even if ,,~e assume for the S'ake. of argument
that the engineer had such a duty, what would be the
natural and probable result of this omission 1 In th.e
natural and probable sequen·ce of events the plaintiff
would certainly have retnoved hilnself to a place of saf·ety
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on either side of the track. The primary 1noving cause
of plaintiff's injuries was plaintiff's pla·cing himself
in front of the train and remaining there in front of
the oncO'rning train. The natur~al and probable consequence of this conduct 'vould, of course, be personal
injury to himself. It must surely, therefore, follow that
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was plaintiff's
own conduct. Without such conduct the injury would
not have been inflicted.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MOTI,ON FO:R DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE E S T A B L I SHE D CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

\V ere it not for the contention made by the plaintiff
that he was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of
the accident there could be no doubt of his contri:but·ory
negligence. See Compton, et al v. Ogden Union Ry. ~-
Depot Co. (Utah, 1951) 235 P. (2d) 515. The question
therefore is whether or not the evidence shows plaintiff
to have been suffering, at the time of the accident, fr:om
a mental illness of such a nature that he could not be
guilty of contributory negligence in conducting himself
in a manner which, f.or any person without such mental
condition, 'vould ·bar recovery upon the ground of contributory negligence.
As a general rule if a person is able to appreciate
danger he m:ay he t,JUilty of contributory negligence. It
is ·only when a person by reason of n1ental incapacity
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is ~vholly unable to apprehend apparent danger an·d to
avoid exposure to it that he cannot be guilty of contributory negligenee. See 65 C.J.S. 782 (Negligence·, Section
141).
In Knox v. Snow, et al., (Utah, 1951) 229 P. (2d) 874,
the court said :
'' ... When the ·defen'Se of con tributary negligence is urged as a groun·d for a _non-suit, it must
appear that reasonable men, acting as triers of
fact, would find, without any reasonable probability of differing in their views, either that the
plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger or
that ordinarily prudent men under the same
circumstances would readily acquire such knowledge and appreciation. As it generally is expressed a plaintiff will not be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that
he had no knowledge or means of knowledge
of the danger, and conversely, he will be deemed
to have been guilty if it is shown that he knew
or reasonably should have known of the peril
and might have avoided it by the exercise of
ordinary eare ... " (Page 876.)
The record ]n this case shows without conflict that
th·e plaintiff ap,preciated that there was danger in the
si tu.a tion ( R. 29). Plain tiff kne"r he -w~as facing ·a danger
wh·en he \Vent on the track (R. 33:.34).
Since the evidence conclusively shows that the plaintiff was aware of the danger inherent in the situation and
that he had the 1ne•ans of rernoving hims-elf from the
track, reasonrable 1nen cannot differ in concluding that
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plaintiff V{as guilty of ne·gligence ·contri~buting to his own
injury. This conclusion cannot be aff·ected in any way by
the rnedical evidence since the sum 'and subst~ance of
that evidence is to the effect only that based upon interviews n1any rnonths later, it was concluded that, at the
time of this accident, plain tiff '"as S'chizophrenic to a
degree ·w-hich is uncertra,in and unknown.
Plaintiff's evidence sho\ved that plaintiff went upon
the defendant's track and remained in front of the oncoming train, in a position of danger to himself, to "test
his faith" (R~ 43). Under such a st~ate of facts it appears
clear that the plaintiff must he held to have assumed
the risk of any danger he might then encounter. As was
indicated by Chief Justice Wolfe in hi~s concurring
opinion in the ·case of ~Clay v. Dunford, et al (Utah, 1952)
239 P. (2d) 1075, if it be shown thrat there is ra clear
risk and knowledge and appreciation of the ·danger, the
ele~ction to take the chance may be classified as 'assumption of risk although it might also constitute coD'tributory negligence.
The evidence here shows (1) a palpably dangerous
condition, namely the approach ~f a locomotive ; ( 2)
knowledge and appreciation of the dange-r as shown
by the statement of the plaintiff that this was a test
of his faith; and (3) a voluntary act by pl,aintiff showing
that he was willing to take the chance as indicated by
his placing himself upon the track as t'he train
approached.
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It -would be a harsh lu\v vvhich would per1nit a person
to throw hintself in the path of an :ap.proachin·g train to
test his courage and to then bring an action against
the railroad for causing~ the injury. It would be equally
as logical to perrnit a person injured while p;articipating
in a game of ''Russian Roulette'' to recover against the
manufacturer of the revolver, or to permit a person
injure·d while atte:rnpting to take his life hy carbon
1nonoxide poisoning to maintain an action against the
supplier of the gasoline or automobile used ~as. his instrument.
In this case the train '\Vas n1erely an instrument being
u·seod by plaintiff to test his f.~ith. in God. Under such
circumstances we earnestly submit the law should not,
and ·does not, hold the owner of. the instrument responsible for the conduct of the person who so uses that
instrument.
That plaintiff well understood the ·danger inherent
in tl1e situation is established by the evidence indicating
his conduet to be a test of faith. Without danger, th·ere
could he no test.
That plaintiff had the means of ~avoiding the injury
is sho,vn by the fact that he crossed the tracks and there
pl~aced himself bet'\veen the tracks.
Since plaintiff knew of the danger and -could have
avoided it, he is guilty of contri,butory negligence as a
matt,er of law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF
THE WITNESS SKEEN RELATIVE TO OVERLOADING OF
THE TRAIN.

During the course of the trial the plaintiff sought to
introduce so1ne evidence by witness Skeen as to whether
or not the train "\\7as overloaded (R. 68). The trial court
pointed out to counsel for plaintiff that there was no
contention in the pretrial order that the defendant was
negligent in operating an overloaded tr~ain, nor was 'aD
issue of fact framed to permit introduction of that evidence. (R. 13, 14). The ·court further p·ointed out that
if the evidence was ofrered for the purpose of showing
that the en~ineer \vas negligent in the operation of a
train as it was then constituted he would let the evidence
in, but if the evidence was offered to elicit a new form
of negligence by 'vay of driving an overloaded train, the
objection would be sustained (R. 70).
CounS'el for plaintiff immediately abandoned this
line of questioning without an offer of p roof that the
train did or did not react as if it were overloaded. There
is accordingly no error in the judge's ruling which is
reviewable by this Court. See Newton v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines (District Court of Appeal of Calif., 1951),
237 P. (2d) 682.
1

Even if the court's ruling were properly before this
Court, there was no error in the ruling. In the pretrial
order the issue \Vas \VhetJher the defendant was negligent
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in driving the tra1n. The contention 1nade by plaintiff
was that the engineer negligently f.ailed to bring the
train to a stop. Plaintiff at no time conten·ded the train
was ·overloaded and that defendant 'vas negligent in
operating an overloaded train. Further, there was no
evidence or offer of evidence to sho\v that the stopping
·distance would have been appreciably less had the load
been less.
There 1s an additional reason why the· trial court
did not comn1i t reversible error in excluding tlhe testimony. sought to be elicited from Skeen. Duri~g the
course of the questions being a~ked of Skeen eoncerning
his experience, it was establish·ed that he_had not operated
a locomotive of the kind in question. His only experience
had been, in geiieral, ·experience on another railroad,
"There he '\Vas operating a different kind of locomotive
(R. 59, 60). Wh-en the court atte-mpted to question him
to detern1ine whether or not he could h'ave an opinion
coneerning overloading of the train ·by reason of being
a p·assenger in the cab, he was never able to give the
court sufficient facts to determin-e the answer to that
question. (R. 64)
Thus, it is apparent that even if he had been ~allowed
to testify, his · opinion would have had so little weight
as to have been n1eaningless and the evidence could not
have a~fected th·e ruling of the trial court.
In su1nmary, therefore, on this phase of the case, it
1s clear that the trial court ruled correctly since the
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theory on which plaintiff 'vas attempting to proceed
had never been presented in piaintiff 's complaint, in his
amended complaint, or in either of the pretrial hearings
on this case. Furth-er, plaintiff Inade no offer of proof
to enable the court to detern1ine whether the alleged
overloading of the train could have had a causal connection with the accident, and it does not appear that
plaintiff had available any facts -to support suc:h an
offer of proof even if one had been made.
CONCLUSION

The facts in this case do not appear to he in conflict
on any n1a terial matter. They rev·eal conclusively that
this accident occured when plaintiff, who was apparently
normal and not unusual in appearance, stepped from a
place of safety into the middle of the train track in front
of an oncoming train 'and, despite every warning that
.could be given, remained there to be struck ~by the locomotive. Until the train was 50 yards away, the train crew,
under any standard of care known to the law, had the
right to presume pl'aintiff would remove himself to a
place of s:afety. When he did not, the crew aeted instantly
to stop the train, but it was too late.
Under such circumstances, it would be a judicial
travesty to dete-rmine that the train operator was negligent. Such 'a holding would place upon the railroads
the intolerable burden of stopping a train whenever
any p~rson entered upon the tracks, since the operator
could never assume, as operators have rightfully assumed
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for generations, that the person on the tra-cks would
yield the right of way to the train, so that the train
couid, jn sorne measure, subserve the convenience and
safety of the public.

The J udg1nent of the DiS'trict Court was correct,
and it shoul'd be affirme·d.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. SNOW and
H. G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and ·
Respondent.
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